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REGULATION AND THE LOCATION
OF JURISDICTIONAL POWERS:
THE FISHERY*
By ANTHONY
I.

SCOTr**

INTRODUCTION

This article, partly about fishing regulation, is placed at the constitutional
level. For that reason it does not, and should not, deal with the variability of
political policy-decisions under differing constitutional arrangements. Quite
different decisions might emerge from centralized than from decentralized
regulatory powers, and yet others might be implicit in the working of individual property rights under "de-regulation" of the type sketched in the
final sections. My position is that amplified in the third paragraph: the assignment of powers and our attitude to centralization ought to be independent of
the subsequent policies adopted under those powers. This position, an adaptation of the Breton-Scott view of the assignment of regulatory powers to different levels of government, is conveyed in Part II; the constitutional position
regarding fisheries' regulation in Canada is detailed in Part III; and a critique
in the form of a proposal for a new system of regulation with new constitutional bearings is sketched in Parts IV and V.
In the process I have adapted the writing of others with little attention to
the accuracy of the attribution; for this an apology is owed. The most important aspects of many other studies of regulation have been played down: relationships among those who are being regulated; who the regulators are; what
they hope to gain in a public-choice sense from their activities and decisions;
and so forth. These very important matters do play a role in Part II, for they
all come into the organization costs of different assignments of a regulatory
function. Other subjects slighted here are the raising of revenue incidentally to
fisheries regulation, and the "competitive" behaviour of provinces given
powers that can attract industry or revenues. These two questions should enter
any decision about the assignments of regulatory powers in a federation.
This study does not rely on the concept of economic efficiency in fisheries
operations for its views on the efficient assignment of fisheries' regulatory
power. Efficiency does play a large part in many studies of fisheries' regulation including those of this writer. But we cannot in one decision settle all
problems. There are too many variables. The assignments of powers problem
requires that we keep track of such matters as the preferences of various actors
@Copyright, 1982, Anthony Scott.
* Organizers of the symposium and participants made useful comments. In addition, I
must thank Professors P.A. Neher, P.H. Pearse and A.R. Thompson for valuable suggestions, most of which I have attempted to incorporate. My debt to Albert Breton is
revealed throughout Part II.
**Professor of Economics, University of British Columbia.
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in fisheries' regulation; their effectiveness in getting their way; the distinction
between allocation of resources and distribution of the gains from fishing; and
the dimensions of a federal structure. To superimpose on these variables the
familiar theoretical welfare-economics criterion by which governments have
been judged by their success in achieving economic efficiency in the fishery
and everywhere else would be too much. Hence so far as is humanly possible
for an economist, this central theme in much writing about the choice of actual
fisheries' regulations has been suppressed, surfacing only in connection with
the aim of minimising organizational costs (Part II).
In short, this is an exploratory study in which ideas on federal powers
have been applied to the assignment of one function: the regulation of the
common-property fishery. In one section the best level of government to which
to assign this power is suggested. But the suggestion has not been widely tried
out. What is hoped for is that the line of argument will become clear enough to
obtain general discussion.
II. THE OPTIMAL ASSIGNMENT OF REGULATORY FUNCTIONS
AMONG CENTRAL, PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
This part explains the approach followed by Breton and Scott in The
Economic Constitution of Federal States. I Although treatment of regulatory
powers in that book is brief, it also implies that a more complete discussion
would follow the treatment of other "allocational" functions or powers of
government. These include, in addition to regulation of the private sector, supply of government services and the raising of revenue.
We may think of a constitution as providing the details of a framework.
This framework, like that of a building, has dimensions. "Government"
makes policies and administers them within this framework. The framework
creates governments and gives each functions, revenue sources, rules for
representation, and rules for decision-making. For example the Canadian
federation's constitutional dimensions provide for three levels of government,
in the units having such-and-such geographical boundaries, in the provinces
having powers over property and civil rights and over their public domains, in
the assignment of indirect taxation to the top level of government and in the
parliamentary system of election decision-making and administration. Once
decided on, these dimensions tend to become permanent. Hence they can be
expected to be adopted with greater deliberation, retained longer, and changed
with greater cost than would policies. Policies, on the other hand, spring from
day-to-day decisions by governments working within a framework which they
regard as fixed. Economic policies are made by the exercise of powers over or
functions concerning the traditional triumvirate: allocation, distribution and
stabilization. A constitutional provision concerning one of the federal dimensions becomes thereafter a "rule" prescribing and limiting each jurisdictional
level's future behaviour. The federal dimensions, taken together, determine
the extent to which the various functions are centralized or dispersed among
governmental levels.
IBreton and Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal States (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1978) esp. chs. 3, 5 and 7.
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Hence, the overall degree of regulatory centralization is the weighted sum
of the number of functions that have been assigned to the central government.
A constitutional act of centralization would therefore involve either reducing
the number of levels of government, depriving the lower levels of regulatory
powers, or both.
A country usually does not have an opportunity to significantly change
the overall degree of centralization of all activities by reassigning particular
functions, for there are too many of them. The familiar allocationdistribution-stabilization triumvirate merely classifies three aspects of hundreds of types of policy present in almost all types of legislation and policy.
Thus, a possible re-assignment of powers to regulate, such as those over
fisheries, is best discussed on its individual merits rather than as a part of a
general trend to centralize or regionalize policy-making. In what follows, an
assumption is made to ensure that the discussion of the fishery is distinguished
from any such campaign.
In introducing this section, a distinction was made between policies and
constitutional dimensions. Some policies become embodied in goods or services that are virtually pure public goods. The lighthouse, important in
fisheries, is a classic example. The benefits of a lighthouse are, up to a point,
equally available to all. Other policies become embodied in what Breton has
called "non-private goods ' 2 and what other authors have referred to as
"quasi-public goods". Examples are police and fire protection, and the international rules of law and order. Fisheries regulation, and the degree of concentration of fish stocks, which have a profound effect on the costs of finding and
catching fish, would also fit into this category. The benefits non-private goods
yield accrue to all, but in uneven amounts, or accrue to only a fraction of the
population. A third product of public policy is the virtually private good:
when provided by government or by regulation, its benefits are available only
to the individuals to whom it is deliverable, 3 and its use by one person reduces
the amount available for others by an equal amount. 4 A ton of fish added to a
stock by a public hatchery, or saved from early catching by public controls,
becomes a private good for whomever eventually lands it.
As already indicated, fisheries depend on unmarketed and sometimes unmarketable products of public policy. Those who accept a "market-failure"
criterion for public intervention must concede that a primafacie case for considering special policies concerning fisheries has already been suggested.
Fisheries, however, is much more interesting than this degree of "publicness" would suggest. Private fishing activity is replete with interdependencies.
Fish as private goods are migratory, and indeed cannot usually be said to be
under the control of vessel or fleet until they are caught. Thus each vessel's activities create benefits and costs for other vessels engaged in finding or catch2Id.at 36.
3

Lawyers and public financiers will notice a symmetry between the definition of a
direct tax and a private good.
4Pigou referred to it as "exhaustible". Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th ed.

London: Macmillan, 1960).
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ing precisely as described in the theories of external economies or
diseconomies. The mere presence of a vessel conveys useful information to
other vessels; its catching reduces or disperses the concentrations which could
have lowered other vessels' fishing costs, and, of course, its catches leave fewer
fish swimming to be caught by others.
In the same way, the net benefits of governments' fish-conservation or
fish-management policies are experienced not only by the vessels that comply
with the rules, but also by vessels that do not comply. These other vessels may,
for example, be exempted from the controls, flout them, or be subject instead
to the controls of some other country or jurisdiction. In this sense, the effect
of government policies spills over into other jurisdictions. Policy-makers
realize that their decisions have a close interdependency with those of adjoining jurisdictions.
When such interdependencies exist, the public-economy literature seeks
an answer to the inefficiencies they create by inventing devices that "internalize" the decisions as to their amounts. The remedies in general range from
controls, wherein the internalization is almost entirely at the governmental
level, through fiscal devices, whereby the actors are guided to government
goals in least-cost fashion, to the reform of individual property rights,
whereby it is hoped that individual market decisions will "automatically"
release government from day-to-day participation. Pigou, following Marshall,
suggests taxes and subsidies. 5 Those concerned with natural resources and land
suggest adjustment of property rights. 6 For example, the question of how to
deal with "neighbourhood effects" of land use has been answered by such
devices as voluntary covenants, zoning and a finer description of the enforceable rights and obligations of each land user with respect to other users.
This mode of solution has been much discussed. In the 1950s I myself declared
that ideal private decisions about how quickly to exhaust resource stocks
depended on complete or "specific" ownership of fugitive or durable natural
assets. It was suggested, for example, fishery's optimum managment was what
would be achieved under "sole ownership". There was a personal uncertainty
as to whether what was urged was that completely specific or sole ownership
should actively be sought, or whether the easily-imagined results of such
ownerships should merely be set as ideals for the looser forms of real-world
fisheries management. In any case, such imaginary descriptions are no longer
regarded as prescriptive. Today, because every natural resource is "naturally"
different from every other, and because each produces a wide variety of conflicting and complementary services for different kinds of users, talk of sole
ownership or specific tenure reduces one to what Leontief once called "implicit theorizing". The fact that interdependency, spillovers and conflicts arise
when everything is not internalized does not logically entail that the best policy
is to bring about an internalization. Less drastic reforms may be not only more
fair to those already participating in resource use, but also less costly in terms
of the resource and its alternatives.
5

Id. at 192.

6Coase, "The Nature of the Firm", reprinted in American Econ. Assn., Readings

in Price Theory (Hareward, Illinois: Irwin, 1952) at 331-51.
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It has been argued elsewhere 7 that the common property, spillover-ridden
fishing industry cannot be rationalized by reform of property institutions
alone. Continuing "on-line" management of fish stock and fishermen will
probably be necessary. This view is maintained in what follows. Complete deregulation is never examined. Rather, the question of the assignment of
regulatory powers is explored.
The ubiquity of externalities and spillovers in fisheries has made it an
often referred to sector when considering the assignment of government
responsibilities between levels of government, and "internalization" has
played a prominent role in debating the most ideal assignment. For example, it
can be argued that efficiency calls for jurisdictional boundaries to coincide exactly with the "span" or "scope" of the services a government provides and
the regulations it enforces. This is because in its political decisions on these
matters, a government will consider the costs of taxation and compliance and
benefits to its own citizen-residents. Jurisdictions can generally be expected to
inadequately provide services or controls that benefit outsiders, the worse the
fit of a service's technical "span" to the jurisdictions' geographical boundaries, the more deficient will be their provision of services and regulations. A
moderate version of the argument concludes that powers to provide a service
ought to be assigned to that level of government having jurisdictional areas
closest to the typical span of the service provided. But the approach has had
disappointing results. True, some light is shed on a useful role for interjurisdictional grants. But as Breton and Weldon 8 agreed in the mid-1960s, and
as Breton and Scott make clear in The Economic Constitution of Federal
States9 and in the Design of Federations,10 arguing from a desire to internalize
spillovers produces little that is useful to the theory of federalism itself. This
theory certainly has not helped much in determining which level of government should be charged with the provision of particular policies.
Two approaches have been attempted. Under the approach implied by
sole ownership all powers are assigned and all boundary lines are drawn so as
to eliminate the interdependencies of government activities. It has been found
that this approach leads to the conclusion that decision-making, bureaucracy,
enforcement, finance and provision should be highly centralized. In particular
a number of writers have concluded that powers to redistribute or to stabilize
(that is, to purposely apply macroeconomic policies) should be assigned to the
highest level of government." Furthermore, because "no man is an island"
and because the economy, the ecology, the environment and their hydraulicoceanic-meteorologic interdependencies stretch endlessly around the globe, it
must be concluded that every other public function should also be assigned to
top-level decision-makers. Federalism and national sovereignty just become irritating man-made obstacles to solving unbounded problems. Clearly this ap7 Scott and Neher, eds. PublicRegulation of Commercial Fisheriesin Canada (Ottawa: Econ. Council of Cda., Min. of Supply and Services, 1981).
8Breton and Scott, supra note 1, at 41n.
9
Id., ch. 4.
'0 Breton and Scott, The Design of Federations(Montreal: Institute for Research
on Public Policy, 1980).
1See, e.g., Oates, FiscalFederalism(New York: Harcourt, 1972).
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proach provides a handy rationale for unitary world government, but no
guidance as to where to stop before that limit is reached.

The second use of this approach is more sophisticated. It consists of
balancing advantages against disadvantages in deciding where to assign certain

powers. Using complete centralization, justified as above, as a starting point,
those who use this approach seek to gain the advantages of decentralizing the
assignment of functions. At the most fundamental level there is the notion
most powerfully put in The FederalistPapers (1787) -

but rarely explicit in

Canadian writing - that federalism provides economic and political individual liberty. This is because under federalism political powers and the attendant individual coercion are fragmented among jurisdictions. Furthermore,
the same fragmentation leads to competition among the units. Federalism is
neither necessary nor sufficient for, but certainly facilitates, an escape from
coercion.
While the notion of decentralization was put forward by Madison and his
colleagues in terms of political liberty, it also has important economic
analogues. Economists have argued that federal structures allow citizens to
choose between "bundles" of public services and regulations offered by
governments of different provinces or other units. The more jurisdictions the
federation has, the more easily and inexpensively the citizen can shop around
for his perferred mixture of public and private goods, taxes and regulated activities. Furthermore, the smaller size of each jurisdiction makes it less expensive for citizens to successfully signal their desires to the government. Finally,
the task of each government in responding to these signals is made less costly
because political mobility, mentioned as the first point above, can also have
the effect of making the preferences of each provincial population more
homogeneous and hence easier to satisfy.
These advantages of the decentralization of regulation and supply suggest
that they are substantial offsets to the "internalizing" advantages of centralization. Thus there appears to be a neat solution to the problem of finding
the right degree of centralization in allocating rights and powers. As the process of decentralization increases both the costs of spillover and the benefits of
satisfying local preferences, the correct solution is to stop the process when the
marginal costs are just balanced by the marginal benefits. This process is suggested by many writers,
and comes very naturally to economists; Oates builds
12
his model around it.
It has been suggested 13 that this second approach has three major difficulties. First, it is non-operational. Neither the benefits nor the costs are
observable or even dimensionally homogeneous. Second, benefits and costs
are not independent. The freedom of choice and liberties of the subject in a
unitary state are not a simple fraction of those in a fragmented economy. Instead, both the structure of the economy and the rents and surpluses of the
consumer may be qualitatively different with each increase in decentralization.
Third, the approach confuses powers with policies or performance. Even if the
12 Id.

13Breton and Scott, supranote 1, ch. 4.
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first two difficulties could be ignored, the optimal degree of decentralization
would appear to depend on what parties chose to legislate. Consequently,
there would be no stability in the assignment of powers; each new election
would make the assignment just as vulnerable to amendment as lists of statutes
and orders.
Both the simple "internalize-the-spillovers" approach, and the equally
non-operational "marginal benefit equals marginal cost" approach are unfavourable. Instead, another approach is advocated - one anticipated by
both Coase and Tullock in other contexts. 14 This approach is based on coordination. Governments providing regulation or supplying goods and services
do not need to re-assign their powers to deal with transboundary interdependencies. Rather, it is only necessary for these governments to continue
to do what they already do: agree about which and how much of each spillover
should continue. This may be called "co-ordination", but it also involves cooperation, joint production, parallel legislation and outright purchase, compensation or bribery. Flows of spillovers can be exchanged against each other
(transactions in kind) or against cash (grants and transfers).
Any kind of co-ordination has costs that are conceptually separable from
the production costs of providing goods, services and regulations. All such
costs (similar to transactions costs) may be called "organization costs". Accordingly, the best assignment among governments of all powers to spend, tax
and regulate is that which minimizes the required associated total of organization costs.
Organization activities use up scarce resources. Not only must one consider the costs of co-ordination, which may eliminate the disadvantages of
spillovers, but one should also consider the governments' costs of administration and the citizens' costs of signalling and political mobility. These four
types of organization costs are defined as being all-inclusive; every organizational activity comes under one of t e four heads. Are these costs fixed, or do
they vary with the way in which pov ers are assigned among jurisdictions? To
show that they may vary, and so can be minimized, imagine that the other
costs of government, however assigned, are fixed, or at least independent of
organization costs.
If, for example, the power to regulate an activity, such as fishing, is under
constitutional consideration, how would the four types of organization cost
vary under complete centralization as compared to under complete decentralization? Consider co-ordination first. In fishing regulation this cost is
never zero. Even when there is only one government, co-ordination with other
states over ocean activities, and with other levels of government over uses of
lakes, streams and seas that conflict with biological management and
economic profitability is a costly activity. If the regulatory power is assigned to
even more numerous, "lower" levels of government co-ordination costs will
necessarily increase. One important reason for this is obvious: fish do not
respect jurisdictional boundaries. Hence, biological and economic policies can
'4 Tullock, "Federalism: Problems of Scale", Public Choice, v. 61 Spring 1969 at

19-30.
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be nullified if agreements are not made among neighbours. The costs may well
be greatest when each jurisdiction has only a few neighbours. This may be so
because negotiation might take the form of non-competitive bilateral bargaining, similar to the upstream-downstream problem in transfrontier environmental bargaining. The downstream power often has nothing, except
money, to offer to the upstream power for its co-operative abstention from,
for example, catching all the fish that downstream policies have protected.
Even when the jurisdictions are more evenly matched, and can co-operate
on an equal basis, Christy and Scott,15 Munro 16 and others have shown how
difficult coming to a mutually profitable agreement on managing a single fish
stock can be.
Now consider administration costs. These stem from the setting-up and
operation of institutions not directly needed for the provision of public services. Two costs that immediately come to mind are the costs of decisionmaking in a representative government, and the associated costs of obtaining
technical and political information about alternative policies and about the
distribution of the benefits and burdens of these alternatives. Buchanan and
Tullock in The Calculus of Consent 17 referred to these costs as the "costs of
decision-making". Such costs will probably be greatest when there is complete
centralization of power over fishing. In this circumstance, the decision-makers
not only must familiarize themselves with the problems and opportunities in
separate fisheries, but also must investigate the pros and cons of combinations
of nationally uniform, rather than regionally-differing, policies. Because they
must investigate their political support under these alternatives, they indeed
would seem to have internal difficulties, politically and administratively,
equivalent to the external difficulties of co-ordination if many small and
separate governments, each responsive to its own electorate, had to harmonize
their respective fisheries policies.
Between the unitary and small extremes of centralization there may lie an
internal minimum of government organization costs. For example, it is possible
that assignment of regulation powers to each government along its own coast
would cut down combined political and technical information costs, and the
costs of internal agreement and external co-ordination. Some amount of interjurisdictional bargaining would be required in any case. There cannot be any a
priori forecast as to which level of assignment will cut co-ordination costs to
their lowest amount. In any case, government organization costs involve both
co-ordination and administration, and these may decrease as the degree of centralization of regulation is increased. Consider elected fisheries governments,
which might be local, provincial, regional, or national to take only four
possibilities. Co-ordination costs would decline as a unit's area increased and

15Christy, Jr. and Scott, The Commonwealth in Ocean Fisheries(Baltimore: John
Hopkins, 1965) chs. 2 and 10.
16Munro, "The optimal management of transboundary reasons", C.J.E., v. 12
Aug. 1979 at 22.
17Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbour: Univ. of
Michigan Press, 1962).
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boundary problems became fewer and more internalized. But administration
and political costs would generally increase, reflecting the problems of searching for localized preferences and compromising between them. Furthermore,
administration and political costs would be extremely high if a new form of
elected jurisdiction were inserted between other levels of government for just
one fishery. For example, an elected Canadian Atlantic fisheries legislature,
directly representing voters in all four Atlantic provinces and charged with all
their fisheries matters, would be in an anomalous position, somewhat similar
to that occupied by an elected school board in municipal affairs. In such
narrow-function governments, implicit vote-trading and log-rolling are extremely difficult, not only because most elected members have intense feelings
about most items on their agendas, but also because their reciprocal negotiations with more conventional governments in the area can rarely be improved
by "linking" problems of unequal concern to the parties. While such an
intermediate-level body seems most appropriate, there are two other patterns
of administration that might have lower organization costs. One pattern is to
share the powers, allowing them to be occupied concurrently by both senior
and junior levels of government. An application of this pattern to fisheries
shall be discussed below.1 8 The other pattern is to appoint a non-elected administrative and regulatory council including decision-making personnel
drawn from both levels of government.
In practice, such federal-provincial or provincial-municipal bodies usually
are information-exchanges and co-ordinators rather than regulators.
What about the response of citizens' organization costs to the assignment
of regulatory powers? The usual argument would be that compliance (and
complaining) costs for fishing regulations are least when both politicians and
administrators are locally-elected and appointed. It has been almost too easy
for those who are regulated to complain about the unresponsiveness of government whose seat is remote. Such regulators are said to be "unresponsive" to
local problems, but surely national politicians are just as eager to be re-elected
as local politicians. There is, then, no obvious reason why their interest in
regulatory policies should be different. Another frequent argument is that central governments are usefully more remote, in that they stand above the local
commotion surrounding the regulation of common-property activities. This
argument would suggest that central governments are less sensitive to local
issues than local governments. Comparisons of local and national representatives' responsiveness to local issues are not useful because neither their constituencies nor their powers to act are the same. For example, for debating and
bargaining convenience, national constituencies are usually larger than locallegislature ridings. Thus, a national representative may have more industries
or activities within his riding than a local member. A local representative
member may easily be persuaded to carry the complaints of his voters to his
legislature. But this is unlikely to be effective. With a smaller constituency,
and hence fewer and less diverse interests behind him, he may have less
bargaining power when he gets there. Such a representative may be more
"responsive", but his fellow legislators may be less likely to cater to his
18.See

infra, Part IV.
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priorities. In brief, signalling costs may vary with the size of the jurisdiction to
which regulatory powers are assigned, but the direction of the variation is difficult to predict, and indeed, may vary from power to power.
A final issue to canvass in the costs of regulation debate is that of mobility.
Citizens who do not like the bundle of policies, taxes and regulations provided
by a jurisdiction can, by incurring the costs of citizen mobility, move to
another jurisdiction. Such costs naturally fall as the number of alternative
jurisdictions increase. It may also be suggested that the exercise of the power
to regulate land and ocean resources is unlikely to provoke interjurisdictional
mobility. This is because while participants in such industries are already
mobile in their fishing activities, they cannot usually take the natural resource
with them by "voting on foot". Hence, they move only by changing their occupation. This is tantamount to saying that mobility is probably always too
costly a form of citizen response to regulatory policies to be widely used,
whatever the degree of decentralization.
In this part, an attempt was made to apply more directly the theory of the
assignment of functions in a federal state to the narrower question of the
assignment of regulatory powers. A distinction was drawn between powers
and policies. Then it was assumed that either level of government could legislate, regulate and provide policies if a power were assigned to them - only their
organization costs of doing so would differ. Indeed they could, if they chose,
provide the same standards of regulation or public services. It is probable,
however, that they would not choose exactly the same policies.
III. THE EXISTING ASSIGNMENT OF POWERS TO REGULATE THE
FISHERY
Natural resources are regulated in Canada through two types of authority - authority to legislate and authority stemming form ownership (proprietorship). Both are mentioned in the ConstitutionAct, 1867,19 but both also
have connections with earlier legal traditions and with international law. The
two types of fishery authority do not coincide in Canada, and there are many
areas or activities in which uncertainty and conflict can arise, unless coordination has cleared the way in advance.
Under the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal government obtained
powers to legislate with respect to "sea coast and inland fisheries". 2° It also
22
21
received powers to legislate for "navigation and shipping"; "agriculture"
(which may include aspects of water and land use); "the criminal law ' 23 (in1930-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, sched.
B of the CanadaAct 1982, c. 11, s. 91(12) (U.K.).
20 30-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. 11, s. 91(12) (U.K.).
2130-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item I of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. 11, s. 91(10) (U.K.).
22 30-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item I of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11, s. 95 (U.K.).
23 30-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. 11, s. 91(27) (U.K.).
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cluding some uses of boundary waters under the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty2 with the United States); and to impose almost any kind of tax or fiscal
regime. 25 These powers, especially the first-named, are all widely used. Most
regulated Canadian saltwater fishermen would mention the federal government as being the authority with whom they deal. But the provincial proprietorial power has not been negligible. Under common law the right to fish is
an incident of ownership of the land underlying a body of water. Initially, the
owner of all land rights, the Crown, could alienate these to the private sector.
There also has been long recognized a "public right of fishing" in tidal waters
to which the ownership by the provincial Crown, by the federal Crown below
low water and by private persons, is subject.
Although differing arrangments remained when the various provinces
entered confederation, section 109 of the Constitution Act, 186726 ensured
that they generally retained the Crown's ownership of public lands. Consequently, the right to fish continued to be held by the provincial Crown in "inland waters" and the "foreshore", whether these were fresh waters or salt, except to the extent that private persons had received grants from the Crown of
beds of lakes and streams and the accompanying right to fish. Later land
grants included river and lake beds, and the fisheries above them; these,
however, were the exception, the general rule being provincial retention of the
beds of rivers lakes and streams.
Under the Constitution Act, 1867 the provinces also have powers to
legislate concerning the Crown lands, 27 wide powers over all property and civil
rights, 28 and powers over industry. 29 The first two would enable the provinces
to, in effect, change the terms of the arrangements by which lands and rights
to fish went into private hands. For example, all inland fish might be declared
to be provincial property, whether or not impounded or caught. The proprietorial power, however, presumably cannot be changed by provincial
statute within the coastal and "inland waters" fringe of the province. Under
other heads in the ConstitutionAct, 1867, the provinces also have considerable
powers to legislate to control fish processing, especially on shore. 30
Thus, there is considerable federal-provincial overlap or "concurrence".
On the one hand, the federal government has an exclusive power to legislate
concerning all fisheries. This has been held to give Ottawa overriding power to
2436 Stat. 2448, III Redmond 2607, 12 Beanans 319.
2530-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched.

B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11, s. 91(3) (U.K.).
2630-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item I of Sched. to the Constitution Act, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)
2730-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11, ss. 92(5), 109 (U.K.).
830-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the Constitution Act, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11, s. 92(13) (U.K.)
2930-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct 1982, 1982, c. 11, s. 92(10), (16) (U.K.).
3030-31 Vict., c. 3 as am. by item 1 of Sched. to the ConstitutionAct, 1982, Sched.
B of the CanadaAct1982, 1982, c. 11, s. 92(10), (16) (U.K.).
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enact regulations and restrictions, including the right to modify or remove the
public right of fishing in tidal waters owned by Ottawa (below low water), even
if such legislation significantly reduces the value of interests in provincial
fisheries. On the other hand, "provisions prescribing the mode in which a
private fisheries is to be conveyed or otherwise disposed of, and the rights of
succession in respect of it,"' 3 would be provincial. It has also been held that
"the terms and conditions upon which the fisheries which are the property of
the province may be granted, leased, or otherwise disposed of, and the rights
which consistently with any general regulations respecting fisheries enacted by
the Dominion Parliament may be conferred therein, appear proper subjects
for provincial legislation .... ,,32
In view of this diversity of legislative powers and ownership rights, and in
view of the wide variety of conditions under which fish are protected and
fishing is controlled, close co-ordination between federal and provincial
authorities has become an obvious part of governments' policies. For example,
in some provincies the fisheries' departments patrolling rivers and lakes rely to
some degree on orders under the federal FisheriesAct, 33 while in others most
fisheries' administration is undertaken for both governments by the federal
government.
In tidal fisheries, the federal government's powers become more extensive
as the distance from the coast increases. In the new Extended Economic Zones
(as within the old three-mile limit) only the federal government may regulate.
Closer in, the provincial government has proprietary powers over lands in inland waters over which tidal water stands, can exercise powers governing
property and civil rights to the extent that marketable property rights licences
or catch are created, and does legislate concerning the handling of fish once
the act of "fishing" is completed and "processing" begins. Certainly the
federal government exercises powers that are most complete in the ocean
fishery; and is least effective in controlling the activities in an inshore fishery
or in an onshore processing plant.
We may particularize. Management in the form of opening or closing of
such important fisheries as salmon, lobster, halibut, cod and herring is undertaken by federal officers. Considerable provincial co-operation, however, is
required. Salmon, for example, are anadromous. Thus, the inland protection
and enhancement of spawning salmon stocks requires provincial acquiescence
or active co-operation. Further, lobsters and oysters are caught in shallow
water under conditions in which either the provincial proprietary right or the
public right to fish in tidal waters could become as important as federal
fisheries power. Finally, cod and herring are caught close inshore in shallow
waters by using fixed gear that could be declared to be under provincial property laws, even if their use was still subject to the general federal control over
all fish and fishing.
31
32

A.G. Cda. v. A.G. Ont., Que. andN.S., [1898] A.C. 700 at716 (P.C.).
Id.

33
R.S.C.
34

1970, c. F-14.
R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14.
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Most federal fisheries powers are enacted under the Fisheries Act. 34 This
Act also implements an asserted federal power to prevent inland water pollution or obstruction that might be deleterious to fish. It may be questioned
whether the regulation of so many varied activities should properly come
under the control of one Act. Whether so much anti-pollution policy, for example, can continue to be controlled under a federal fisheries statute is moot.
Perhaps even the Act's provisions for direct management of inland and
anadromous fisheries would not today get past Parliament or the courts.
IV. DETAILED ASPECTS OF FISHERIES REGULATION
Fisheries regulation is not accomplished by a relatively small number of
complicated, self-enforced decisions, such as those found in telephone or radio
regulation. On the contrary, fisheries regulation is embodied in a multitude of
standing rules, one set for each stock of fish or species on each coast. In addition, fisheries management is accomplished by enforcing a large number of
"on-line" decisions by which recent seasonal information about fish numbers,
spawning, sizes and perhaps markets are converted into orders to "open" or
''close" each fishing ground to certain or all types of gear for specified periods
of time. The standing rules are discussed and negotiated among conflicting industry and regional groups, politicians, biologists and buyers or packers. They
set the general framework
within which catching and marketing take place for
35
the next year or two.
Fishermen, packers and consumers are equally interested in the managers'
"on-line" rulings. These are decided quickly and announced by radio and
telephone. They almost inevitably affect the fleet unevenly; losers will say unfairly. Migratory stocks that fail to arrive or resident stocks that are unexpectedly prolific, markets that skyrocket or plummet, vessels with new catching power, foreigners who suddenly take an interest, weather, water
temperature, land transportation and strikes in other industries, can all force
the fisheries' officers to reconsider their initial decisions about when, where
and how to bring in the current harvest. In this context, it is common that
discussion and debate are replaced by anguished, angry and violent pleas and
accusations. Fishermen and processors incur heavy overhead costs and find it
useful to remind the decision-makers about how much they stand to lose in interest and inventories if decisions are adverse. In such an atmosphere it is difficult to isolate the chief elements in fishery regulation.
The process can perhaps best be described by using the economic concept
of spillover introduced in Part III. Spillovers occur when some effects of an
activity are not contained within the enterprise, but are transmitted to help or
harm other enterprises. Where the effect spills directly from one party's
premises to neighbouring premises, the remedy involves negotiation and agreement leading to a change in the behaviour of the two parties: abatement by the
originator plus defensive action of some kind by the victim. Restraint, fences
and exit are frequently mentioned.

31 If one or more foreign countries are fishing the same stocks or the same waters,
these standing rules must make provision for them. Consequently, the rules will take on

even more formal, semi-permanent, legalistic characteristics.
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In applying this concept to the fishery, we find that the effects are felt
some time after, or many miles away from, the cause. Neither the originator
nor the victim of a particular effect can identify the other party. Furthermore,
numbers are large and uncertain, and some of the effects may even have a
public-good rather than a depletable character. In short, information, enforcement and monitoring are so costly for the individual fisherman that pairwise
negotiations and agreements between fishermen rarely take place, and the effect is an uncontrolled spillover.
One way of controlling spillover is internalization or centralization. At
one extreme, a single private enterprise can take over management so that
stock, harvest and fleet are under one regime for a number of seasons. At the
other extreme, a single government service can take over management of
stock, harvest and fleet for an indefinite period. Variations on these extremes
can be imagined. The single enterprise may actually be a grouping of firms, a
fishermen's co-operative, or a joint council. The single government management unit may be an interjurisdictional council with powers to recommend or
even with delegated powers to manage and harvest.
Such unified control is seldom found. Instead we observe what
economists have described as a common-property fishery under close governmental regulation of private harvesting. There may be completely open access
with a public right to fish subject to certain restrictions. Or there may be
licencing, with access limited to those who can first obtain a permit. Many
variant systems combining restricted access with managed day-to-day fishing
exist, the combination depending in part on whether the original fishery was in
the high seas beyond national territory or whether it was in a coastal zone.
Whatever the combination, the fisherman's bundle of rights is very thin, giving
him neither rights to the fish in the water nor to the water itself.
It is not difficult to understand how the many combinations of layers of
fishery regulation of access and catching come into being. Consider the following process in a common-property area without government controls. If the
relative price of fish in the marketplace rises, the intensity of private fishing
will increase and the stock of fish will be threatened by depletion. Even before
the fish vanish, costs of finding and landing a full hold will increase, and there
will be demands for public regulation of the "over-fishing". This pressure will
be quite general, for most vessels and companies are affected to the same extent. Differences in skill and equipment cannot insulate anyone from the scarcity of fish. Incomes become too small to provide subsistence for the crews or
to cover the owner's debts. One response is welfare. In Canada, for example,
there was a redefinition of unemployment insurance to provide part-time income to workers, plus miscellaneous subsidies or rebates on new vessels,
docks, gear and supplies. Obviously, such response is welcome, but it does not
address the heart of the problem: the translation of increasing fishing pressure
into a fading fish population.
The resultant intervention into the fishery is itself compounded by the effect industry has on politicians, fishing biologists and administrators.
Historically, official actions can be explained by saying that the regulators act
as if they have a number of different purposes.
Perhaps the first of these purposes is to prevent the speed and capacity of
the fleet from continuing to reduce the fish stock annually to a level from
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which it cannot quickly recover. Regulators traditionally accomplished this by
discriminating against certain fishermen, primarily outsiders. Wars and peace
treaties centered on who had fishing rights. Today, the same result is accomplished by licensing, closing the fishery at crucial times and restricting or
forbidding the use of particularly destructive gears. Related to this goal of
preventing stock depletion is the desire to prevent other fish, caught or damaged in the catching of the main species or size-group, from being inadvertently
damaged or decimated. This approach to regulation does not touch the expanded size of fishing power of the fleet. The administrator tries to protect the
fish stock and make it available fairly to all vessels. In doing this, the approach
is like a police approach to congested city streets, in which the increased
number of cars is simply accepted, and an effort is made instead to keep traffic
moving by detailed controls, one-way streets and so forth.
The purpose revealed by a second approach is to reduce the total amount
of fishing effort that is brought to bear. This has been primarily because when
there are too many vessels, the biological goal mentioned above is almost impossible to attain by restrictive controls. Owners equip vessels with more speed
and storage capacity in order to make the best of the times when there are no
closures. As a result, closures become more frequent. Some fish are therefore
nearly wiped out, while others swim through a gauntlet completely
unharvested. The genetic composition of the fish stock is also affected by the
increasingly sporadic open and closed periods. Furthermore, the regulators
find it almost impossible to learn what is happening to the stock when a very
large fleet of vessels turns up every time there is to be an opening: often the
fishery is to be closed before the regulator receives any information about
what has been caught in the brief open period. The waste of labour and capital
as represented by too many vessels is not itself a concern for this approach to
regulations.
Third, regulators wish to act with fairness. Even if they did not,
spokesmen and interest groups clearly and loudly express the demands of
vessels using different types of gear, fishing from different ports, fishing in
different parts of a gauntlet, available to fish in different periods or different
weather, or fishing for sport or for profit would insist that their claims be
given fair weight. Processors in different places serving different markets with
different final products voice their support for certain groups of fishermen.
Spokesmen for regions, provincial governments, and ethnic groups also have
decided preferences about sharing the harvest. Each decision will produce
some losers who are quick to criticize, sometimes in the form of united interest
groups and sometimes as independent enterprises. The regulator, in Canada,
cannot separate these individual, protective or distributive aspects of his decisions from those aspects in which he is the expert: fish reproduction, migration
and growth. It is commonplace that fisheries public policy is more concerned
with distribution than with allocation. This is what one would expect when individuals discuss the use of common property.
A fourth purpose of regulators is to make bargains with foreign fishermen
or over-the-side buyers and thereafter to arrange this pattern of fishing such
that the foreigner gets what he bargained for.
Fifth, regulators sometimes wish to change the nature of the product.
For example, they may wish to regulate in such a way that all fish are taken
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when they are more valuable, or when they are more reproductive. Another
frequent event is for a fishery to move over from a raw-material meal or
chemical process of catching fish by the ton to being a food fishery where
every fish is a candidate for a final consumer's table, and each must be landed
and stored at much greater expense. Another example is the decision in a
multi-species fishery to change the emphasis from one species (and its gear and
season) to another, although both species are affected by either technique. In a
common-property fishery such decisions can rarely be made marginally: the
whole fleet must usually move from one gear-time-place-product target to
another.
Sixth, they may wish to move the fishery from the capture of wild fish to
the harvesting phase of some sort of aquaculture in which the fish are bred,
released and caught somewhat as cattle on a range. Once again, such a decision
can rarely be made marginally or even experimentally: the whole fishery must
adopt the new technique.
In all these aims regulators are supported by more than one interest group
and opposed by others. The division of interest is not usually along federalprovincial lines, although each province does, of course, wish to increase
employment, income and business activity stemming from fishery activity,
even if it must be at the expense of other provinces. But many of the problems
are seen as no-win questions for local politicians and are left to the federallyemployed regulatory service to resolve as best they can.
In this endeavour, nearly all parties agree that the first and second
motives mentioned above call for a reduction in the number of participants.
This can be accomplished by reducing the number of licenses by various arbitrary or fiscal means: licenses can be retired, bought in, or taxed; or the industry can be made less attractive by taxation or levies. Each method has been
shown to bring a cloud of administrative and economic problems of its own.
I and my collaborators have studied each of these methods, of which
some examples do exist. In consequence we have come to prefer over fishing
licences a system of catch quotas or landing rights, each assigned to a vessel or
captain. 36 These are examined in the next seven paragraphs. Ideally, they
would be denominated in numbers of fish, and subdivided as to place of capture, species and perhaps time. They would be transferable, and perhaps auctioned anew every year or so.
Much to be preferred to mere transferability would be full marketability
and divisibility. Under such a scheme today's paralyzing questions - what
port, what gear, what fishermen and so forth - could be handled impersonally in the marketplace. A regulator would still be needed, but his decisions
would need only to be announced as a number. This number would have
meaning for every quota-holder, confirming, increasing or decreasing his
catch of that species at that place to which he was previously entitled. The
fisherman at sea who wanted to land more than his new entitlement could buy,
36 Scott and Neher, supra note 7. See also Pease, Conflict and OpportunityToward
a New Policy for Canada'sPacificFisheries,a Preliminary Report of the Commission
on Pacific Fisheries Policy, Oct. 1981.
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or rent, portions of quotas from less keen fishermen. Economists will not need
to have spelled out how such a market would work, especially with the instant
information produced by radio. Note that the "on-line" regulator is, ideally,
freed from making interpersonal discriminations or distributive judgments.
How foreigners might be fitted into this scheme is discussed in the Newfoundland reference Report of the Economic Council of Canada. 37 In general,
they too would have catch quotas, but their rights to acquire more would be
somewhat limited.
The manner of making massive decisions about species, age or condition
would probably remain as difficult as with today's regulatory regime. Voting
by fishermen would be conceivable, regarding the limited number of quota
holders as a species of shareholder: their votes might be weighted in accordance with each holder's degree of participation in each region, class of catch or
type of gear.
The supervision of the distribution of entitlements to fish should not be
performed by the regulatory agency responsible for managing the fish stocks.
Even under the present system of licencing, licencing should not be the concern
of stock managers. The reason, already recognized in the use of separate agencies to manage buy-back schemes in fisheries, is stated at length by Scott and
Neher. 38 The ideal would be something like the Torrens system of registration
in the land market, relative to the system of zoning regulation. Government
performs two roles, but keeps them separate. A better model perhaps is the
division of authority between the management of common-property oil fields
and the administration of a system of leases conveying certain rights to
develop and produce oil. In Alberta, the former is run by the somewhat independent Energy Resources Conservation Board and the latter by the provincial minerals department. I am proposing here that independence be given to
the body administering the registration and market in rights: so long as the two
bureaucracies are separated it is a secondary question which should be an arm
of day-to-day political policy and which should have its independent terms of
reference. In the final part separation by responsibility to different levels of
federal jurisdiction is proposed.
How should the initial distribution of quotas be made? Royal Commissioners know that the transition from regulation to rights is redistributive and
therefore resisted. One feasible programme would be for the government to
phase in a system of quotas by accepting the implicit claims to the catch that
now are represented by fishing licence. Fishermen would be sold or given dated
or perpetual quotas proportional to their recorded catches of the previous few
39
years. This would not be easy. To deal with it Pearse in his 1981 report
recommends that the initial distribution should be accompanied by an injection of buy-back money as compensation to ensure that everyone is better off.

37

Econ. Council of Cda., Newfoundland: from dependency to self-reliance (Hull,
Que.:38Cdn. Gov't Pub. Centre, Supply and Services Cda., 1980).
Supra note 7.
39

Supra note 36.
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What is important is that the quota system itself will, through market
pressures, tend to bring about the "right" number of vessels and men. When
quotas are marketable and divisible, fishermen will buy, rent or pool their
quotas so as to divide their time efficiently and to get workably large catches
per vessel. This is the unique result of a quota system. Because there is little to
be gained from buying licences under the alternative licence-to-fish system,
transferable licencing would not bring about a diminution in the amount of
catching power. Buying back vessels or buying-in entitlements by an official
agency is necessary under licencing and an available alternative under quotas.
In this procedure the agency uses a royalty tax on licences or quotas, a licence
fee, the proceeds of an auction of licences or quotas, or some combination of
these to reduce the number of vessels or the amount of fishing pressure. Pearse
proposes a combination, plus an injection of funds from government. While
such a subsidy has been criticized, it is probably preferable to the present subsidizing of vessels, gear and ports or to unemployment insurance.
Ideally, catch quotas should be specific to designated fish stocks, dates
and places. In practice they would probably be an improvement over the
licence system even if they were generally designated by such groupings as
northern cod, Bay of Fundy herring, Pacific halibut and so forth. Conversely,
catch quotas should not be specific as to the gear or type of vessel to use them,
but should be tradeable between inshore fixed-gear and offshore trawlers of
seiners in order to get the most mileage from the regime. This mileage comes
from two benefits: a replacement of the distributive function performed by
fishery managers by the initial distribution plus market dealings; and a reduction in the costly racing and capital stuffing that emerges when vessels compete
for a scarce stock.
The foregoing has been a simple sketch of a property-rights (quota)
scheme. It is one of a number of systems that could be assembled from standard regulatory components, having greater or lesser demands for information,
marketability of entitlements and so on. Variants range from proprietory
management by a small community of fishermen to detailed governmental
controls and managements combined with scarcely-restricted, licenced, fisherman access. In practice most systems are pieced together to deal with a local
situation, which may well be in a state of crisis at the time a regime is first
adopted. Well-known alternative components include licences to enter a
fishing ground, to land fish, to own a vessel or to use a certain gear. A licence
or quota can be perpetual, for a fixed period of years, for its owner's life or
annual. It can be transferable among owners, fisheries or vessels. If the
transferability of an entitlement is through a market (or by government auction) it will, naturally, find its way into the hands of the bidder most willing to
pay for it. This is usually an advantage because such a person may have a
strong comparative advantage in fishing. It will be no advantage, however, if
the market in entitlements is more perfect than the capital market on which
funds for acquiring rights, or for investment in equipment, are acquired.
Under these circumstances, as is the case with present-day licencing systems,
marketable rights would tend to drift into the hands of those with the greatest
borrowing power.
To avoid costly capital stuffing and racing behaviour by most vessels, it is
necessary that before each season commences most fishermen believe that the
official fleet Total Allowable Catch (TAC) (of which their quotas are percen-
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tage shares) is not appreciably larger than their estimation of the fleet's catch
for the coming season. This condition is not easy to satisfy. It is not sufficient,
for example, for fishermen's expectations of the fleet's annual catch to be
distributed symmetrically around a median that is less than TAC. This
distribution would be adequate for a majority of fishermen to collectively vote
for a policy of forbidding themselves to invest in vessels and gear in excess of
that needed to land the catch at minimum costs. But in the absence of such
fine-spun collective regulation, this distribution is not adequate in a quota
system to deter those who expect that the sum of assigned quotas will exceed
the TAC from individually acquiring personal insurance in the form of such
investment. Ultimately, their misgivings will alarm other fishermen, who will
also re-examine their expectations, and almost certainly, attempt to invest
themselves. The condition to be satisfied, then, is that most fishermen must be
seen by their brothers to have confidence that the sum of all quotas is well
within the fleet's expected catch. This condition would be approximately
satisfied if participants in the fishery, having adjusted their pre-season investment in crew, vessel and gear to the size of their assigned quota in the TAC,
believe that any shortfall would impose a smaller loss, or a smaller short-run
cost in extra hours of fishing and supplies, than additional prior investment.
Further, because investment in capacity and speed is a long-run matter, this
condition must be expected to hold during most seasons during the life of a
fisherman's equipment. Finally, the expectation must be held not only by the
fishermen themselves, but by anyone else who would be sufficiently harmed by
a shortfall from the assigned quota to protect themselves by protective investment (by dealers or processing firms, for example).
These conditions would be least likely to be satisfied in a fishery having
widely fluctuating annual catches. In such circumstances, the prediction of
runs, catches and stocks is costly if not unobtainable. Consequently, both the
fisherman's prior guess about his season's catch and the official prior estimate
of the season's TAC are apt to be very wrong. As the uncertainty in such a
fishery increases, we would expect the excess investment to approach the level
reached if the quota system were not used, and fishermen or vessels merely had
licences to fish. Note that the uncertainty need not be about unpredictable
natural fluctuations: fishermen are also likely to overinvest if the accuracy of
each tentative official TAC, the permanence of standing regulations or the
reliability of the exclusiveness inherent in existing licencing systems are not
trusted.
This means that any good regulatory system - one that does not invite
cautious overinvestment - will be reliable and predictable in its decisions.
When these decisions concern entitlements inherent in a licence or quota, there
is much to be said for this becoming a conditional right, unlinked both to the
management system that sets the TACs and the open periods, and to the politicians to whom the managers are responsible. The content of any entitlement
indeed should be defined so that it is independent of management and politics.
It follows from this criterion that a regime in which a quota does not carry an
absolute right (for example, an absolute right to a certain percentage of each
season's TAC) should have its entitlements reviewed and reworded so that
something, however little, is guaranteed to the owner each year. If nothing of
this nature can be done, the idea of rights, obligations and exclusiveness
should, for that fishery, be abandoned.
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It may have been suggested in these paragraphs that the choice of a
regulatory system is predetermined by the organization costs inherent in each
system in its application to a particular fishery. Perhaps this ought usually to be
the case, but it is not. The choice is made politically. Politicians respond not
only to the intensity and frequency of voter preferences on fisheries matters,
but also to the need of obtaining the support of representatives of fishing constituencies and interests for other policies in their agenda or platform. Thus,
the selection of fishing policies may be influenced by controversy concerning
other matters, so that the number of "other matters" that the government is
empowered or obliged to make policy about may be an important determinant
of whether organization costs, or their distribution, or the distribution of
fisheries rent, employment or patronage is the key consideration in selecting a
fisheries regime. Bureaucrats and advisors must also have an important influence. Merely listing these influences will suggest, however, that the regime
chosen will not be independent of the level of government at which the choice
is to be made. The proportion of citizens interested in fisheries, the number of
"other matters" to be resolved, and the power and doggedness of advisors and
bureaucrats will vary with the size and level of the jurisdiction. It will be seen
in the next part that organization costs also will vary with the level of jurdisdiction.
V. A NEW SYSTEM OF FISHERIES REGULATION
What should be the roles of Ottawa and the provinces in selecting and
organizing a fisheries regulatory system? In this section the capacity of the
Breton-Scott model to answer this question will be considered. For brevity, the
question can be put normatively, on the presumption that the aim of the
assignment of powers over the fishery is to minimize organization costs.
Two cases may be distinguished. Consider first a small local fishery, such
as that for an isolated groundfish or crustacean stock exploited by a local
labour force, fleet, port and processing plant. Under these circumstances the
fish are not vulnerable to the activities of outsiders - neither fish nor
fishermen migrate. Organization costs would surely be minimized if the power
to regulate this fishery were assigned to a jurisdiction close in size to that of the
local fishing community. Unless there were economies of scale in such activities as search, signalling, and administration, these costs would only increase if a larger body, one at a higher level, encompassing more than one such
fishery, were to be given regulatory powers. If, on the other hand, a level of
government having jurisdiction over a territory smaller than the community
exploiting the fishery were empowered to regulate the fishery, that government
would be expected to have higher organization costs than in the higher, wider
jurisdiction. This is because a more local government would have duties not
only to administer regulations but also to co-operate, bargain or struggle with
the other government(s) also empowered to regulate the same fishery. Unless
there were powerful diseconomies of scale in administration (such as the disappearance of the self-enforcement possible among small numbers of the
regulated), search, signalling, or migration, the costs of co-ordination would
tell strongly against a very small regulatory unit.
The second case is an extension of that suggested by the very small
jurisdictions mentioned just above. In this case there are many external
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linkages in each fishery. Each stock is, or could be, fished by more than one
gear and by vessels from more than one port. Each port's vessels exploit more
than one stock. Finally, each stock is mobile between regions and mixes with
other stocks in the catchable phase of migration. In brief, there are many communities, many fisheries, and many stocks and several gears. This nightmare
actually confronts managers in Canada and abroad.
It seems clear that under such circumstances a single management - a
government empowered to regulate having jurisdiction broad enough to encompass all these locations, fish and persons - would have decidely lower
costs of co-ordination than would smaller jurisdictions. Unless its enforcement, search, signalling, migrating and information costs were so high as to
swamp these external costs, organization costs would be lower. The higher the
government the more inclusive its jurisdiction. Indeed, regulation by either a
central government or by a council of lower governments is most commonly to
be expected in these circumstances.
In the United States and Australia for example, fisheries both within the
three-mile limit and in internal waters are under coastal-state control. Most
relations with foreigners, and most regulations governing offshore fisheries
are under national control. Co-ordinative instruments to deal with interstate
control are inadequate for the fisheries-regulation organization costs to be
other than in excess of the minimum necessary. Australia has only six statelevel fishing jurisdictions, so that co-ordination may not be too costly; but the
United States has more than twenty jurisdictions attempting to manage small
parts of a larger seamless ocean ecology.
Dissatisfaction with the co-ordination thus achieved, and realization that
its Law of the Sea stance obliged each region to allow foreign fishermen to
take what local fishermen disregarded, has recently led to a radical change in
the United States' system. Now there are six or seven regional Fisheries Councils, with staffs, representing the member states and the federal government,
and empowered to make many decisions applying both in inshore and in the
extended fishing zones. Few Americans have much to say in praise, so far, of
these embattled and hardworking bodies. But they do seem to represent a
promising compromise between internalized national control of all fisheries,
and dispersed local control of access to and investment in localized stocks and
grounds.
The Canadian system, already described, is a second alternative. It appears to be workable now, though under great stress and pressure. Federal
regulators essentially make all the tidal fisheries decisions from licensing to
landing, making little distinction between provinces or communities; they do,
however, liaise with the provinces over port, processing, pollution inspection,
marketing and other onshore ramifications to the extent they see fit. The
resource is essentially a fief of the federal Crown, under arrangements so
strong that they overshadow provincial development, shipbuilding, processing
and employment policies connected with fishing. Given their regulatory
powers, it would be natural for the provinces to experiment with preserving
their newly-acquired grounds for their own fishermen. Some fishermen would
be locked in, others locked out, with the same fishermen sometimes newlyprotected gainers and sometimes newly-excluded losers. Some fishermen
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would consider moving their home ports to provinces from which they would
have legal access to fishing grounds, others would invest in larger and speedier
vessels for raiding the traditional grounds now closed to them. Many would be
signalling vigorously, calling on their regulators to obtain for them access to
old grounds, to exclude foreign raiders or to manage domestic grounds now
subject to new pressures from fishermen who formerly fished elsewhere. In
response, governments would be busy administering domestic fisheries,
managing the new pressures, fending off outside raiders and, by force and
bargaining, protecting migrating fish from being caught in other jurisdictions.
But not all fishermen and certainly not all provincial citizens would prefer
an autarchic policy. Since the Maritime Union Study the provinces have shown
a willingness to co-operate both to cut administrative costs and to achieve
higher returns from their resources. To the extent that these people had their
way, signalling and migration would induce governments to search for ways to
manage jointly fisheries in a more certain way, or at least to obtain access for
outside fishermen to managed fisheries in other jurisdictions. Furthermore,
some boundary fisheries must be jointly managed.
While some of these activities merely repeat what some citizens and
governments would be doing if the fishery were controlled by the federal
government, those that stem from taking provincial maritime boundaries into
account are new. Among these are the fishermen's costs of migrating and of
extra signalling, although part of this would be transitional and not inherent in
the new assignment of powers.
It can be argued that on the Atlantic coast this federal dominance is what
one would expect, considering the level of organization costs that would be entailed by an assignment of powers to regulate fisheries to the provinces or to an
even lower level of government. In this inquiry it is expected that the provinces' regulatory policies would be autarchic and protectionist. But a distinction must be made between constitutional powers and the policies pursued
under them. Consequently, the possibility that some or all provinces would
seek to manage overlapping fisheries without regard to their own fishermen's
wishes must be kept open; although, many fishermen fish close to their home,
and although fish, notably lobster, are not migratory over long distances. It
would be impossible to protect either from the pressure of "outside"
fishermen by drawing boundaries without cutting across the natural complementarities between multi-purpose fleets, ports and plants serving near and
remote fisheries of overlapping seasons. Taking these managerial coordination costs into account, and recognizing that the borders of the
maritime provinces were not drawn to enclose the neighbouring fisheries, it
can be concluded that managerial organization costs, including those of
citizens, fishermen and governments, would increase substantially under any
policies.
In the above sentence the word "managerial" is used in a strictly
allocative sense: where, when and at what cost are fish to be preserved and
caught? In a broader sense fisheries regulation includes the organization costs
of settling distributionaland proprietary claims. These include the claims of
citizens in different parts of Canada to the rent of the fishery, or to relief from
the expenses of managing it (including claims of Atlantic province citizens in
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particular); the claims of fishermen to exploit particular grounds; the claims of
other fishermen to exclude the previous group; the claims of buyers and processors to their share of the landed catch, and; the claims of buyers in Canada
and abroad to fish at lower prices. Today not all these claims give rise to
organization costs because with the passage of time the various interests have
migrated or otherwise adjusted to the present pattern of rights of access.
Nevertheless, because political participation costs little and because access to
fisheries once granted is rarely priced or taxed, individuals and groups have an
incentive to assail constantly managers with conflicting demands for access
and protection. The citizen organization costs arising from this battle are
sometimes obvious, but those costs within the federal government tend to be
lost in the general costs of government and of regulation, and hence are not
recognizable. Thus it is not clear that distributionorganization costs would be
higher under provincial jurisdiction than they already are under federal
jurisdiction. This uncertainty must be emphasized. It is quite possible that
once adjustment had taken place, provincial fisheries policies would look after
distributional and proprietary questions at lower organization costs (to all parties) than when such policies are made and administered by the federal government.
By providing these regulatory policies what distributional activities would
be entailed? Internally, the governments would decide which of their own
citizens (at what price) would have access to provincial fisheries, and which
would fish in outside fisheries to which their provincial government had won
some access. Externally, they would negotiate with outside governments on
three subjects. These are: access to jointly-controlled (boundary) fisheries; access to fisheries controlled outside, and; access of outside fleets to internal
fisheries (the subject of interception of migratory fish also has important
distributional elements). To these should be added two additional subjects
dealing with foreign (non-Canadian) users of provincial fisheries and with the
interception of migratory fish in foreign and in outside waters. It seems possible that provincial organization costs replacing those now arising from federal
distributive activity would be as low or lower. This is because under provincial
jurisdiction, signalling about, and searching for, fishermen and voter response
to distributional aspects of regulation would be simpler and less costly.
More debatable is the claim that provinces' external co-ordination costs
could also be less. Admittedly, negotiating foreign access would be highly visible and contentious but much of it already goes on as part of Canada's external relations. Access by fishermen from other Canadian regions is also already
politically and bureaucratically within the federal government. Given that
fisheries are to survive biologically, access will have to be limited under either

level of government. Deciding who shall gain by explicit intergovernmental
bargaining is not necessarily more costly than implicit selection with selection
within the federal government's offices.
In what follows, a preferred assignment of fishery regulatory powers and
responsibilities will be described. To do so some assumptions will be made
about the relative organization costs with respect to the level of assignment of
regulatory functions: that management for the Atlantic provinces would be
less costly if it were enacted and administered by the federal government, while
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distributional and proprietary questions would entail equal organization costs
at either level; for the Pacific region, with only one province, highly-migratory
fish, and conflicts between gears rather than home ports, there need only be
one level of regulatory jurisdiction for management and for distributional and
proprietary questions of access, and; the choice of regulatory regime has been
answered by the need to share offshore fisheries with foreign nations foreign and domestic fishermen are to hold quotas to a share of each fishery's
Total Allowable Catch. These quotas are to be transferable and divisible, subject to the paternalistic condition that certain grantees cannot divest
themselves of their quotas - native Indians on the West Coast, and inshore
fishermen in Newfoundland, for example. The Total Allowable Catch is to be
set each year by fisheries' officers.
Who will regulate these fisheries, and who will choose who is to have access to them? This is the jurisdictional question. If the assignment of all
powers over the fishery is to be decided by the expected level of permanent
organizational costs, the lower level of costs under federal jurisdiction, stemming from the internalization of controls over mobile fleets and migratory
fish, would be decisive. Under this criterion the present federal constitutional
pre-eminence should be, and would be, continued.
However, if the assignment is to take separate account of managerial,
proprietary and distributional questions, as is permitted in the written constitution, it is possible to contemplate a form of concurrent jurisdiction. The
allocational and management questions would continue to be administered by
the federal government, but questions of access, ownership, rent and revenue
would become provincial matters. To the extent that this function would rely
on provincial proprietorship, it would stretch the present constitution. Outside
internal waters, the province has no ownership powers. The proposal above
would, therefore, require some delegation from the federal government to the
provinces. However, both highway-trucking and fishing licencing can be
delegated now. Whether a system of transferable and divisible quotas can be
given the status of something close to a real property regime and yet have its
administration delegated to a government that is not responsible to its voters
for its existence is a legal question to which there is no clear answer. If it is
feasible, the necessary division of roles would harmonize with both the existing
provincial jurisdiction over most lands and waters (and with the proposed
award of indirect taxation powers over natural resources to the provinces, with
respect to a royalty on catch or on the value of the right of catch) and over
property and civil rights (as strengthened by the "notwithstanding" clause of
1981). The federal government's accustomed role as manager of fish stocks
and umpire of the fishing derby would continue, relieved, however, of much
of the task of deciding who shall fish or of arranging fish management to give
each class of vessel, gear or fisherman an equal chance at the stocks during a
short season.
I have argued that this assignment of powers would produce the lowest
level of organization costs. The quota system has been used as an illustration,
but the argument does not depend on this system being adopted. If the governments rejected quotas and kept the present system of intense and costly controls combined with the weaker licence system, the division of powers in-
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dicated above would still be appropriate. The provinces would be responsible
for issuing licences to their own fishermen, perhaps at a price; the federal
government would be responsible for controlling both gear and season openings. A licensing system would require closer and more costly liaison between
the two levels, for every change in regulations would tend to change the meaning of the licence; a provincial change in the number of licences to use a certain
class of vessel or gear would bring a concomitant federal change in regulations. That is why a quota system is preferable; but, quotas or licences, divided
jurisdictions over management and right are predicted to bring the lowest
organization costs. Intergovernmental liaison would be necessary under either
system (not least for agreeing on rights for foreign-flag fishermen) with divided jurisdiction. Assigning all powers to the federal government would cut
down liaison costs, but, as has been already argued, would increase or maintain costs arising from dissatisfaction about proprietary and distributional
matters.
The traditional approach to jurisdictional questions depends on the efficiency argument rather than on organizational costs. Readers who dislike the
latter as a determinant may wish to consider predictions given under more
familiar heads. What would happen if the provinces were to have control over
quota registries while the federal government controlled openings? Referring
back to Part IV, the reader will see that the advantages of the quota system in
preventing excess investment and racing will all be available. Furthermore
there is no reason to believe that distributional questions would be decided any
less fairly than at present, or than natural-resource related questions decided in
the forestry, mineral or water industries elsewhere in Canada today. Much
depends on the efficiency and fairness of the initial distribution of quotas.
One question from other resource-policy discussions has to do with what
Professor Andrew Thompson once called the "unseemly competition" among
provinces for industrial location and the associated employment and tax
revenues. Opponents of federal arrangements often look for such instances,
where lower-level jurisdictions are forced by monopolies, mobility, and their
own poverty, to give too much in creating incentives for continuing existing, or
seeking new, industrial locations. It would be possible in the scheme outlined
here for the provinces having acquired rights in the market (or in the free-forall when rights were initially distributed) to dispense them selectively to those
whose activities or location they wished to attract. To some this is inefficient.
Their ideal, a neutral set of provincial fiscal systems, is probably not consistent
with federalism. To others it is bad because it is at the taxpayers' expense. Of
course it is. Consider an example in which Newfoundland uses its oil wealth to
buy fishing rights from Nova Scotians. Fearing that it would be stripped of a
fishing industry, Nova Scotia could make sure that its industry did not disappear by matching the Newfoundland offer to Nova Scotia fishermen who
wanted to sell out.
Some authors have fearfully insisted that provinces must be stopped from
ruining themselves by thus disposing of their forests or minerals too selectively,
too cheaply or too soon. In the case of the fishery their fear would probably be
that under the regime of individual quotas the provinces would hold more
quotas for their people than would be justified by the price that fishermen or
provinces elsewhere would offer for them. As long as the federal government
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fishery managers did not weaken and create more quotas than the fishery's
technically allowable catch, little harm could come from such over-investment
in quotas by provinces. Furthermore, the existence of a market in transferable
quotas would help both to signal the extent of any over-investment and to
modify or reverse such a policy at low organization costs.
Those who fear interprovincial competition also fear that provinces and
their regulatory agencies will be unable to withstand industry pressure with the
same resolution as the larger, richer, central government. It we examine such
pressure under the fishery quota scheme we find two types. One would be
pressure to change the "on-line" within-season fishing rules. Such pressure
would, in fact, be directed against the federal government under this scheme.
The other pressure would be to obtain fishing rights. Doubtless, politicans are
always under pressure from vessel owners, communities, parishes, unions and
processors for fishing concessions. However, once the right to land fish
became marketable, politicians would find it difficult and unpopular to make
gifts of quotas. The cost to the province would make such generosity just as
conspicuous as if any provincial government today should give away oil leases
or units of its public debt. It is only when a licence, quota or lease is unmarketable that politicians and bureaucrats find it possible, and are pressed,
to give away portions of the public domain without limit and without
criticism. Thus the enforcement costs to the provinces should not be high,
while the management costs borne by the federal govenment would be reduced.
In this part I have both expounded the advantages of an individual catchquota system, and recommended how this system should be based on existing
federal and provincial powers. In effect I have advocated that one part of the
regulatory function should be shifted from government to market. The function of overseeing this market in rights would be, and should be, primarily
provincial. From this the burden on federal biological fisheries managers
would be lightened and the function played by impersonal economic forces
would increase. Incidentally, a role would emerge for the provinces analogous
to that played under proprietary powers over their other natural resources.
From the constitutional-theory point of view, our way of looking at the
present proposal is as follows. The power to regulate fisheries, a large and
amorphous power, should be assigned concurrently to the two levels of
government. Co-ordination activity would then lead to a division of roles between them. The federal government would manage the fishery and its environment, subject to co-ordination with conflicting activities in the province.
The provincial government would manage a market in fishery quotas, subject
to co-ordination concerning the Total Allowable Catch as set by the federal
managers. If a royalty, boat licence or other management system were instead
chosen, co-ordination and bargaining would lead to a somewhat different division of roles, and different needs for co-ordination and administration. The
present division of powers over the fishery, however, can be conjectured to
have emerged from an understanding of organization costs, so that any system
of regulation would work best when the comparative advantages of both levels
of government are realized.

